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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 970422-CA

RICHARD WOLFE ,

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURI; OF PROCEEDING

This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of Assault a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in
violation of UCA §76-5-102 after a bench trial on February 24, 1997, empaneled by Honorable,
Roger Bean.
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred upon this court pursuant to
UCA §78-2a-3(e).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I

The court erred in convicting the defendant based upon the repudiated hearsay statement
of Patricia Kling when there was no evidence or corroboration.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

When the Court rulings are based upon Conclusion of Law, we review the decision for
correctness. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P. 2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
CITATION TO THE RECORD

The appellant properly moved to arrest the judgement of the court and a hearing was held
on said motion on May 19, 1997, before the Honorable Judge Roger Bean. (Transcript p. 134157)
POINT II

The court erred in considering the pre Miranda silence as evidence against the defendant.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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Admission of evidence is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. However,
the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations should be given deference by the appellate
court and only be overruled when they are clearly erroneous. State V. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694 (Ct.
App. 1993); State v. Tavlor. 818 P 2d 561 (Ct. App. 1991).
CITATION TO THE RECORD

The defendant objected at the hearing on motion to arrest the judgement to the court
considering the defendant's silence as evidence (Trans. P. 136-137 lines 10-25 and lines 1-5) and
the court found that said evidence was admissible (Trans P. 156-157 lines 17-25 and lines 1-3)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION STATUTES AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Amendment V— No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.
Amendment XIV— Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Article I — Section 12. In Criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgement, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of
6

that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence imposed after the defendant was found
guilty of Assault, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in violation of UCA §76-5-102. Pursuant to
written memorandum dated April 10, 1997.
Mr. Wolfe appeals his conviction and sentence based upon the following:
1. The court committed reversible err when it failed to grant defendant motion to arrest
judgement when the conviction was based upon the refuted hearsay statement of Patricia
Kling.
2. The court committed reversible err when it considered the defendant's post arrest pre
Miranda silence as evidence to corroborate the victims hearsay statement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The purported victim testified that she gave a written statement to the police which was
in writing and the city moved for it's admission (trans. P. 39 lines 19-25 and P. 40 lines 1-13)
and it was admitted (Trans P. 63 lines 13-25 and P. 64 lines 1-13). The defendant then testified
that she was the initial aggressor including kicking the defendant in the groin (Trans. P.46 lines
23-25 and P. 47 lines 1-23). Patricia Kling then further testified that she attempted to tell the
officers at the time that she was the aggressor. She also testified that she stated this same to the
City Attorney at a later date (Trans. P. 108 lines 16-25 and P. 109 1-18). Further she testified
that the statement in exhibit one was not entirely true (Trans P. 41 lines 13-23 also see Trans P.
86 lines 19-25).
Thomas Hill testified that he was one of the officers responding to a 911 call. He testified
that the defendant did not complain of any physical injuries or make any statement concerning
this matter (Trans P. 74 Line 17-21 Trans P. 75 Lines 23-25 and P. 76 1-3). Mr. Hill further
testified that the defendant was never given his Miranda rights or had any conversation with him
(Trans. 76 Lines 8-17).
The defendant testified that Patricia Kling had slapped him twice and kick him in the
groin and he slapped her when she tried to hit and kick him again (Trans 103 lines 13-21) He
further testified that he had told the officers that she had struck him (Trans P. 104 lines 5-20)
ARGUMENT
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POINT I

The court committed reversible err when it failed to grant defendant motion to arrest
judgement when the conviction was based upon the refuted hearsay statement of Patricia Kling.
The appellant raised the issue of self-defense, both through the testimony of Patricia
Kling and himself, during the trial and therefore the city has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self defense. See State v. Knoll 712 P.2nd 211
(Utah 1985). The conviction in this case is based upon the refuted statement of Patricia Kling
wherein she did not tell the officers that she was the initial aggressor and the court based it's
decision in this case on the fact that it did not find her testimony at trial credible.
"The issue, therefore, is whether a person can be convicted of a crime solely on the basis
of an unsworn, uncross-examined, out-of-court statement. The United States Supreme Court has
stated that the issue of whether a hearsay statement is sufficient by itself to support a conviction
is " not insubstantial." California v. Green. 399 U.S. 149, 170 n.19 (1970). A conviction not
based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand. It is a "Violation of due process to convict
and punish a man without evidence of his guilt. Thompson v. City of Louisville. 362 U.S. 199,
206 (1960). Much of the evidence under Count I is at best highly unreliable, and none is
probative of the charge actually made by the prosecution, except to a very extenuated degree.
Under Utah law, both currently and under previous rules, the out-of-court statement
attributed to the boy is deemed substantive evidence. Nevertheless, not all substantive evidence
is of equal probative value. During the Senate hearings on the adoption of Federal Rules of
Evidence, the objection was raised that Federal Rule 801 (d) (1) (A), which admits prior
inconsistent hearsay statements as substantive evidence, would permit the government to sustain
a conviction entirely on prior inconsistent hearsay statement. The Senate committee report
states:
It would appear that some of the opposition to this Rule is based on a concern that a
person could be convicted solely upon evidence admissible under this Rule. The Rule, however,
is not addressed to the question of the sufficiency of evidence to send a case to the jury, but
merely as to its admissibility. Factual circumstances could well arise where, if this were the sole
evidence, dismissal would be appropriate.
S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Cod Cong. & Admins,
news 7051 n.21.
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) (A) acts more broadly to admit out-of-court statements
or substantive evidence than its federal counterpart because the Utah rule does not require that
out-of-court statement which is denied at trial by the declarant is insufficient by itself to sustain
a conviction.
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On facts similar to the instant case, the Sixth Circuit Court reversed a conviction based
on hearsay declaration on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. United States v. Orrico
599 F. 2d 113 (6th Cir. 1979). The court held:
[W]hen [out-of-court statements are ] the only source of support for the central
allegations of the charge, especially when the statements barely, if at all, meet the minimal
requirements of admissibility, we do not believe that a substantial factual basis as to each
element of the crime providing support for a conclusion of guilty beyond reasonable doubt has
been offered by the Government.
IcL At 1181 Other cases have also held that uncorroborated, unsworn hearsay statements
alone are insufficient evidence to convict when later repudiated at trial. See Brower v. State,
728 P. 2d 645, 647-48 (Alaska Ct. Appl 1986); State v. Moore, 485 so. 2d 1279, 1281 (Fla.
1986); State v. Allien, 366 so. 2d 1308, 1311 (La. 1978); State v. White Water, 634 P. 2d 636,
639 (Mont 1981) ; Chamber v. State, 755 S.W. 2d 907, 910 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), review
granted, No. 01-86-00520-CR (April 26, 1989); Fernandez v. State, 755 S.W. 2d 220, 222
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988), review granted, No. 01-87-11-5 Cr. (May 1989)
These cases are consistent with Utah law which holds that uncorroborated evidence is
insufficient, by itself, to support a verdict in a civil case. See Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor
Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984); Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 p.
2D 481, 486 (Utah 1981); Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 315, 358 P. 2d
312, 315, 358 P.2d 899, 901 (1961); Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 492,
500, 132 P. 2nd 376, 380 (1942). Recently, in State v. Webb, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (July 21,
1989), this court held that a single uncorroborated hearsay statement was not substantial
evidence and not sufficient to support the verdict. Id. At 29 (Separate opinion of Stewart, j> ,
joined by Hall, C.J. Howe, Assoc. C.J., and Durham., J.).
In sum, a conviction that is based entirely on a single, uncorroborated hearsay out-ofcourt statement that is denied by the declarant in court under oath cannot stand. We therefore
hold that the single out-of-court statement attributed to the boy by Harrison was insufficient to
support defendant's conviction under count I.

POINT II

The court erred in considering the defendant's post arrest pre-Miranda silence as
evidence.
In the case of State v. Palmer 860 P 2nd 339 (Ut. App 1993) the court held that a
defendant's post-arrest pre-Miranda silence, and his pre-arrest pre-Miranda silence is
inadmissible in the Prosecution's Case in Chief and can only be used for impeachment purposes
if the defendant does testify. In this case the prosecution never attempted to impeach Mr. Wolfe
with his pre-Miranda silence. (Trans. P. 105-107 line 1)

9

FILED
MAY - 5 1998
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

COURT OF APPEALS

The trial Court erred when it considered the refuted prior statement of the alleged victim
Patricia Kling, in reaching its decision of guilt of the def when there was not sufficient
corroboration of the prior statement. The court was informed at the time of the motion to arrest
judgement that a conviction based upon a refuted prior statement is not sufficient to base a
conviction unless that statement has other corroboration. If the court had required the
corroboration the motion to arrest judgement should have been granted.
The court erred in considering the appellant's pre and post arrest pre-Miranda silence as
corroboration of Patricia Kling's refuted statement. A defendant's pre and post arrest silence is
not admissible as evidence in the state's case in chief, and is only admissible for impeachment of
the defendant if he testifies. Since the city did not attempt to impeach the defendant by his
silence it was improper for the court to consider his silence as evidence.
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^ClARtiN V. GRAVIS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

In this case there is clearly a conflict, between Mr. Wolfe's testimony and that of the
officers, as to weather or not he made a statement to the officers. The court found that he did not
make a statement to the officers. His pre-Miranda silence, therefor, cannot be used as
corroborating evidence with that of Patricia Klings refuted hearsay statement.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the argument set forth above the appellants judgement of conviction should
be reversed and the case should be remanded to the District Court to enter an order granting
defendant motion to arrest judgement.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
LAYTON CITY, a Municipal Corporation.
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.

961000249

Date

4-10-97

Judge

Bean

RICHARD D. WOLFE.
Defendant

MATTER:

ASSAULT CHARGE, TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT

Through testimony from Ms. Kling, Dr. Holley and Officer Hill, the city established
that the defendant assaulted Patricia Kling on or about January 2 7 , 1996.
The city prosecutor granted use immunity to Ms. Kling and had authority to do so
pursuant to the provisions of § 10-3-928, Utah Code Annotated.
The defendant introduced evidence of justification, or self defense. The city then
had the burden to prove the absence of justification beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Knoll, 7 1 2 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985). The city attempted to do so by
producing testimony of discrepancies between Patricia Kiing's statements of what
happened given at the time of the incident, and her testimony given at trial. The
Court finds the city's evidence to be persuasive. The Court does not believe either
Ms. Kiing's in-court testimony in support of justification or the defendant's
testimony on the same point. They were not believable because:
Ms. Kling had convenient lapses of memory on any facts that were
inconsistent w i t h her in-court testimony on who began the physical assaults,
Ms. Kling and the defendant had reconciled and were back living together.

2
Although Ms. Kling minimized the injuries she received from the defendant, Dr.
Holley's testimony was that, when seen at the emergency room, Ms. Kling
was upset, tearful and very disturbed, had swelling at the bridge of her nose,
had red marks on her neck, was still bleeding from the nose, and had
extremely high blood pressure due to emotional stress. The doctor testified
that Ms. Kling never indicated that she had initiated the use of physical force.
On the contrary, she told the doctor that her boyfriend had hit her in the nose
with a closed fist.
On Officer Hill's second trip to the home, Ms. Kling answered the door crying
and bleeding from the nose. She was very upset and stated her boyfriend had
hit her in the face. The officer found the defendant outside, hiding in a bush
near the side of the house. He told Officer Hill he had hit Ms. Kling. He said
nothing about her having hit him first, and showed no sign of injury. He
walked on his o w n power, he mentioned no pain, and he never claimed he had
acted in self defense.
The written statement Ms. Kling gave the officers stated that the defendant,
having been drinking heavily, shoved her around and pushed her down on the
bed. She retaliated by slapping him and telling him he had to leave in the
morning. He then hit her in the nose with his fist. After he tried to make up
to her and got rebuffed, he put his finger between her eyes and said he would
kill her. Although she acknowledged she'd slapped him, she said nothing
about any kick to his groin.
The Court concludes that the city met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act in self defense.
The Court adjudges the defendant guilty and enters a conviction. The Court sets
the defendant's sentencing on Monday, May 19, 1997, at 10:30 a.m. and orders
him to be present. Additionally, the Court orders him to contact, without delay, the
Davis County office of Adult Probation and Parole, by phone at the number circled
on the paper included herewith, and arrange to be interviewed in the Davis County
office of AP/P. This must be done as soon as possible. They will then have
enough time to prepare a presentence report by the above sentencing date. If the
sentencing date is inconvenient for Defendant or counsel, it can be reset by a call
to the clerk.

Judge

1

witness testifies as ordered by the Court or as

2

volunteered

3

transactional

4

prosecution even from independent

5

than from what the witness testifies

6

it would be broader.

7

purposes of what we're dealing with here it makes a

8

lot of difference.

9

transactional

under the grant of immunity.

10

record

11

as we proceed.

12

immunity would prevent

But

any

evidence

rather

in court and

And I don't know that for

Maybe the City would

immunity.

grant

But the offer .on the

is use immunity and so we'll deal with that

The Court denies the defendant's, defense

13

counsel or the witness's counsel's

14

should say overrules the objection to the question

15

about whether that's her handwriting.

16

the, the witness to answer the question whether or

17

not the statement

18

writing,

that Counsel

request, or I

showed you

THE WITNESS:

Y e s , it is.

20

MR. GARSIDE:

And for the

21

information we've now marked that as

22

EXHIBIT #1.

24
25

is your

ma'am.

19

23

Directs

Court's
PLAINTIFF'S

And Ms. Kling, is that, is that
signature at the bottom of that
MR. GALE:

your

page?

Same objection, Your Honor.

PENNY C. ABBOTT,

CSR/TRANSCRIBER
PAGE 3 9

1

THE JUDGE:

2

overrules

3

answer.

All right.

And the Court

that objection and directs the witness to

4

THE WITNESS:

Y e s , it is.

5

MR. GARSIDE:

And from the time that you

*6

wrote that, well, since the time that you wrote

7

that on that paper have there been any amendments,

8

additions, deletions, any changes that, that you

9

can recognize

in that

document?

10

A.

(THE WITNESS:)

Not to my knowledge, no.

11

Q.

(MR. GARSIDE:)

Your Honor, at this time

12

I'd move for the admission of

13

EXHIBIT #1.

PLAINTIFF'S

14

THE JUDGE:

Thank y o u .

15

MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, I would ask the

16

Court reserve decision until

17

opportunity to cross examine.

18
19
20
21

THE JUDGE:

Mr. Gravis?

I've

had an

All right.

The Court

will

reserve decision on that.
MR. GARSIDE:

No further questions of

this witness at this time, Your Honor.

22

THE JUDGE:

23

CROSS BY MR. GRAVIS

24

(STANDING AWAY

25

MR. GRAVIS:

Thank you.
FOR

FROM SYSTEM
Okay.

PENNY C. ABBOTT,

Mr. Gravis?
DEFENSE
MICROPHONE)

M s . Kling,

drawing

CSR/TRANSCRIBER
PAGE 4 0

1

your attention back to January 26th of last year,

2

you said you went to the hospital and there were a

3

lot of people

around?

4

A.

(THE WITNESS:)

5

Q.

And you gave this written

6

That's true.
statement.

Correct?

7

A.

Yes, sir.

8

Q.

Now who were the people that were

9

talking

to you again?

10

A.

Oh,

there were women, some women from a

11

women's group and the doctor and the police

12

officers and, and all my children were there and--

13

Q.

Now what's been marked

PLAINTIFF'S

14

EXHIBIT #1, is this a true statement of what

15

happened on the 26th of January of last year?

16

A.

17

complete.

18

Q.

19

A.

It's not

Did you tell the officers about more

things that

20
21

It's not entirely true.

occurred?

I really didn't want to talk to them.

really tried to--

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Did you tell the officers other

25

I

that

Just answer my question.

things

occurred?
PENNY C. ABBOTT,

CSR/TRANSCRIBER
PAGE 4 1

1

MR. GALE:

Your Honor, I've

seen,

I've

2

seen this charged and it has been charged by the

3

Weber County Attorney's Office.

4

Court the name, State versus William

5

was charged with aggravated assault

6

a

I can give the
Pledger who
for the use of

steel-toed cowboy boot.

7

THE JUDGE:

Did that go up on appeal?

8

MR. GALE:

I don't recall, Your Honor.

9

THE JUDGE:

You know what--

MR. GALE:

I know it went, I know it

10
11

went to trial and that he w a s , in my recollection,

12

convicted by a jury.

13

status of that case.

14

THE JUDGE:

And I don't recall the appeal

All right.

I don't, I have

15

some question about whether or not that would be an

16

aggravated

17

and order the witness to answer that question,

18

whatever, with whatever consequences

19

for use or transactional

20
21

assault and so I overrule the

objection
for

it may have

immunity.

Do you, do you recall the question,
ma'am?

22

THE WITNESS:

Y e s , I did.

23

MR. GRAVIS:

You recall the question or

24
25

yes you did kick him in the
THE WITNESS:

groin?

Y e s , I did.
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MR. GRAVIS:

1
2

that was

And that was the first blow

struck?
MR. GALE:

3

Your Honor, I assume

4

Court has a continuing order to answer

5

questions.
THE JUDGE:

6
7

questioning

8

examine.

10

then that

This line of

I slapped him first and

happened.
MR. GRAVIS:

11

these

I'm going to allow Mr. Gravis to cross

THE WITNESS:

9

Yes.

the

12

first.

13

struck.

14

hit him first.

Okay.

You slapped him

And that was, the slap was the first blow
So any blows he struck was after you had
Correct?

How many times did--

MR. GALE:

You have to answer out

17

THE WITNESS:

Yes, it is.

18

MR. GRAVIS:

How many times did he hit

20

THE WITNESS

Once .

21

MR.

That was after you'd

15
16

19

22

loud.

you?

him in the

GRAVIS:

kicked

groin?

23

THE WITNESS

Yes .

24

MR.

Nothing

25

THE JUDGE:

GRAVIS:

further.

Thank y o u .
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1

THE WITNESS

Yes .

2

MR.

I have no

3

THE JUDGE:

4

excused.

GRAVIS:

objection

He may, he may be

Thank you, Doctor.

5

THE WITNESS:

Thank y o u .

6

MR. GARSIDE:

Thank you.

7

Tom

8

WHEREUPON,

The City calls

Hill.

THOMAS N. HILL

9
10

having been placed under oath by the clerk of the

11

court and sworn to testify truthfully

12

matter, upon examination testified as follows:
MR. GRAVIS:

13

in this

W e l l , Your Honor, just

14

you denied my motion to strike

15

preserving my appeal issue on that, that

16

proposed EXHIBIT #1 be admitted which

17

statement.

18

THE JUDGE:

since

I have no objection,
State's

is the

Well your, I assume your

19

continuing objection under Rule 804 would

20

that

render

statement--

21

MR. GRAVIS:

Well, Your Honor,

she's,

22

she's testified so I submit that the

23

that based upon your order that she, and the

24

immunity,

25

not relying on 804 at this p o i n t .

she's testified.
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1

THE JUDGE:

Well, because we're here

2

ready to go.

3

804 objection but thought we'd better hear it, you

4

know, and then if I determine

5

objection why we--

* 6

The Court took under advisement

your

that you have a valid

I, I forget all that and a--

MR, GRAVIS:

Well, Your Honor,

what

I'm

7

saying is that since the witness has

testified

8

pursuant

9

answer the questions, then the 804 does .not apply

to your order that you required her to

10

because she's testified and the 804 only applies if

11

the witness

12
13

(short inaudible, no m i c ) .

THE JUDGE:
saying.

14
15

is

you're

You're talking about-MR. GRAVIS:

testified

Oh, I see what

So since she's

she's not unavailable

and,

already
therefore--

16

THE JUDGE:

All right.

17

MR. GRAVIS:

-- 804 doesn't, we don't

18

have to worry about it anymore.

19
20

THE JUDGE:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

21

All right.

Thank you.

BY MR. GARSIDE

(STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM

22

MR. GARSIDE:

FOR
MIC)

Your full name

23

A.

Thomas Nathan

24

Q.

And your

25

A.

Director of human resources

PLAINTIFF

please?

Hill.

employment?
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1

what did you do?
A.

2
3

Placed him in my patrol vehicle to make

transport

to the Davis County

Jail.

4

Q.

How long of a walk is it from where you

5

placed him

under arrest to your, where you had

6

your patrol

car?

7

A.

Not exact but 60 y a r d s , 50 yards.

8

Q.

And did he walk on his own power?

9

A.

Y e s , he did.

10

Q.

Was he

11

A.

Y e s , he was.

12

Q.

Behind his back?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And you and Officer Lowry were

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

All right.

15

handcuffed?

escorting

him?

And, and during that, during

18

that walk did, was there any, any complaint by the

19

defendant

20

discomfort ?

as to any, any physical

injuries, any

21

A.

There was no complaint

22

Q.

Do you recall any conversation at all

23
24
25

during that, during that
A.

Nothing

made.

walk?

specific.

It was some time ago.

I do believe he made mention that he was, had some
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1

military

involvement.

I'm

not exactly sure.

conversation?

2

Q.

So just casual

3

A.

Casual conversation, y e s .

4

Q.

Nothing more about the

5

A.

Nothing.

6

Q.

And then you transported him from there in

7

Nothing

incident?

further at that time.

your patrol car down to the Davis County

Jail?

8

A.

Y e s , I did.

9

Q.

And was there anybody else in your patrol

10

car with you?

11

A.

Just myself and Mr. W o l f e .

12

Q.

And how long of a drive was

13

approximately

that

timewise?

14

A.

Oh,

15

Q.

And then were you required to remain

16

it's 10 m i n u t e s .

while he was initially booked

into that

there

facility?

17

A.

That's correct.

18

Q.

And how long was

19

A.

I do not recall how long time, the time

20

frame was there.

21

simply can't recall.

22

Q.

that?

It was a busy night.

During any time during

But I, I

the transport

or

23

while you were in, in the Davis County

facility

24

waiting

25

Mr. Wolfe state to you that he was in pain or that

for him to be booked, at any time did
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1

he had been assaulted

2

evening?

in any way during

3

A.

There was no mention m a d e .

4

Q.

Nothing

further, Your Honor.

5

THE JUDGE:

6

CROSS BY MR, GRAVIS

7

(STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM

8

MR. GRAVIS:

9

that

Thank you.
FOR

Mr. Gravis?
DEFENSE
MIC)

In fact, after you arrested

him you never even read him his M i r a n d a .

Right?

10

A.

I don't believe

I did.

11

Q.

And you didn't question him so you didn't

12

get into a conversation about what happened

13

you arrested

14

him?

A.

There was no conversation

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

-- as far as that.

18

Q.

Now, were you the one that took the

15

after

further as far

as--

19

statement

from Patricia

20

A.

No, I am not.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

So

N o , sir.

Kling?

when you went

you is that she'd been struck

in the

23

A.

Correct.

24

Q.

You didn't, you didn't

25

precipitated

face?

She said she--

it or anything
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1

THE WITNESS:

Pardon me?

2

MR, GARSIDE:

And who was it that, that

3

struck you in the face that caused your nose to

4

bleed?

5

A.

(THE WITNESS:)

Richard.

6

Q.

(MR. GARSIDE:)

Was it painful?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Nothing

9

further.

THE JUDGE:

10

Thank y o u .

RECROSS BY MR. GRAVIS

FOR

You may cross.
DEFENSE

11

(STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM MIC) V

12

MR. GRAVIS:

This is after you had

13

slapped him and after he'd kicked you, after you'd

14

kicked him in the groin?

15

A.

Well, I had kicked him and then he tried

16

to hold me away.

17

verbal going on.

18

that's when he hit me.

19

Q.

Okay.

And it was v e r b a l , a lot of
And I tried to kick him again and

And you said you told that to the

20

officer who took your statement

21

the hospital.

22

about the

23

A.

24

fault.

25

Q.

Right?

at the police, at

You tried to tell him

kicking?
I tried to tell everybody

it was my

Nobody wanted to listen.
Okay.

Nothing

further.
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1

verbal argument with each other and there was a lot

2

of things said, name calling.

3

a little shoving between the two of us.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

Yes.

Did, at any time did you

for a few minutes.

7

minutes

8

I was outside.

later and I really can't tell you how long
Continued

arguing.
Where did you

go?

11

A.

Out in the back

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

And we just continued

yard.

arguing.

14

little shoving, name calling.

15

twice.

16

some marks on my chest where, where

17

me .

I was

Again, a

slapped

I was kicked in the groin once.

I, I had

she had hit

And she went to kick and hit me again and

18
19

leave?

And I came back in a few

You say you went o u t s i d e .

9

I was--

I, I went outside to get some air

6

10

I believe there was

I slapped her.

20

Q.

You slapped her

where?

21

A.

Across her nose, or her nose.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

I, I felt bad.

And then what

happened?

I tried to apologize.

24

helped, tried to help her stop the bleeding.

25

was screaming and crying, u p s e t .
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1

went outside.

She didn't, you know, want to be

2

around m e .

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

The police came.

And what happened

next?

I was scared and I was

5

outside of the back of the h o u s e .

6

me what had happened and I told them that she had

7

struck me a couple times and I had slapped her.

8

Q.

9

Okay.

And they asked

When you said you told them she

started it, did you tell, did you tell the

10

officers

where she'd struck you?

11

A.

12

Yes.

I said she had slapped me and kicked

me in the groin a couple times.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

They put handcuffs on me and hauled me

15

And then what

happened?

down to Farmington.

16

Q.

Did you talk to the officers any

17

A.

There was a little discussion

18
19

of the car.

further?

in the back

And I know that I had told them that

II I, they had never--

I'd been hit and I struck

20 || her
21 ||

Q.

22 II

Okay.

Nothing

THE JUDGE:

further

Thank you.

You may

cross

2 3 II examine .
24 ||

MR. GARSIDE:

Thank you.

Your Honor

25
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1

CROSS BY MR. GARSIDE

FOR

PLAINTIFF

2

(STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM

3

MR. GARSIDE:

4

drinking

that

MIC)

Mr. W o l f e , you'd

evening?

5

A.

That's correct.

6

Q.

To excess ?

7

A.

I don't believe

8

Q.

You don't think that you were

9

A.

Well, yes.

it was to excess.

after five or six beers, y e s , I was

11

legally
Q.

I--

drunk?

I, I was probably--

10

12

been

I guess

probably

drunk.
And wasn't your first, the first

argument

13

that you had with her was about the fact that you

14

wanted to drive home from where

15

were, whatever club that you were at?

16

your first

17

A.

18
19
20

was.

it was that you
that

argument?

I really don't recall what the

argument

If it was about a p a r t i c u l a r person or-Q.

Or whether you wanted

to drive and she

didn't want you to drive?

21

A.

I, I cannot answer that.

22

Q.

You don't recall

23

A.

N o , I don't.

24

Q.

And but the argument

25

Wasn't

were at the

that?

started while you

club?
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1

A.

That's

2

Q.

And continued when you were at home?

3

A.

That's

4

Q.

And a, basically

5
^6

what you were
A.

correct.

correct.
it was a shoving match is

saying?

It was a verbal yelling match.

7

it turned into a little shoving.

8

turned into getting
Q.

Did you drive from the

10

A.

That was 13 months ago.

12

And then it

club?
I really

don't

recall if I drove from that club or not.
Q.

But you're not having any problems

13

anything else memory-wise

14

correct?

15

then

struck.

9

11

And

A.

other than that.

I, I really don't know on

16

evening if I did drive or not.

17

duties.

that

with
Is that

particular

We share

those

18

Q.

Did you know that she had called

19

A.

No, I did not.

20

Q.

Do you recall any of the, any of the words

21

that were used during your arguments?

22

recall the topics of, of the

23

A.

I do not.

911?

Do you

arguments?

I d o n ' t , I don't really-- I

24

can't tell you for sure what the argument

25

about.
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ijj

1 II

Q . I

2 ||

have nothing

further, Your Honor.

THE JUDGE;

Thank you.

4

MR. GRAVIS:

Nothing

5

THE JUDGE:

You may step down,

3

Further

II direct?

6

Mr. Wolfe.

7

Thank you.

MR. GRAVIS:

8

Honor.

9

WHEREUPON,

10

further, Your Honor.

We call Patricia Kling, Your

PATRICIA

KLING

11

having been placed previously under oath by the

12

clerk of the court and sworn to testify

13

in this matter, resumed the stand upon

14

testified as follows:

15

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. GRAVIS

(STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM

17

MR. GRAVIS:

18

under

MIC)

understand you're

still

oath?

19
20

examination

FOR DEFENSE

16

You

truthfully

THE WITNESS:
Q.

Y e s , sir.

Just to clarify something.

The

21 \\ time the officers arrived had there beerir

first
what kind

22 || of physical altercation had, had happened prior to
23 || that
24 ||

time?
A.

Very verbal and probably

25 || wouldn't--

some shoving.

I

But I, I don't really remember to be
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1

really honest with you.

2

Q.

Okay.

But after, so after the

officers

3

had been there the first time, that you kicked

the

4

defendant.

5

A.

I slapped him first and then,--

6

Q.

You slapped him first and then kicked him?

7

A.

--

8

kicked

him.

9

Q.

Correct?

and then he tried to hold me off and I

And that--

And then when you tried to

10

kick him again is when he hit you in the

11

Okay.

face?

And that--

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

today?

15

A.

Y e s , I am.

16

Q.

And did you try to tell the officer who

And are you telling the truth

I'm

telling

17

took your written statement

18

happened?

19

A.

20 II

attorney,

Y e s , I did.

the truth.

that this is what had

I even told the

prosecuting

the woman, the truth when I talked to

21 il h e r .

22 ||

Q.

So are you referring to--

23||

A.

Yes , I am.

24 ||

Q.

-- this lady here?

25 ||

A.

Y e s , I am.

I told her.
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MR. GALE:

This one or--

THE WITNESS:
3

MR. GALE:

4

THE WITNESS:

Yes
Susan Hunt.
Well,

5

talked to m e .

6

representing,

7

I don't know whether it was Susan or her but it was

8

a woman and I did tell her.

9
10
11

I'm not sure.

it was the one that

she was the one that talked to me.

MR. GRAVIS:
A.

(THE WITNESS:)

probably

She was

Okay.

When

was.that?

I do believe

she was

blonder.

12

Q.

(MR. GRAVIS:)

13

A.

When we first come to court and she wanted

14

to talk to m e .

15

fault.

16

Q.

17

that earlier
Yes.

19

Q.

Okay.

Mr. Gale about
A.

22

called

23

Q.

24
25

And now when did you first talk to
this?

Probably the day after it happened I
him.
Okay.

told the Court
A.

And I told her then it was my

(short inaudible, no mic) ?

A.

21

that?

Was that when Mr. Gale was with you or was

18

20

When was

And did you tell him what

you've

today?

Yes, I did.
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1 ||
2

P R O C E E D I N G S

II

(MAY 1 9 ,

3

THE CLERK:

Number 1 7 .

4

versus Richard Wolfe.

5

hearing and sentencing.

6

Layton City.

7

defendant.

8
9

1996)

Lavton

961000249.

Set

All right.

for

for the

Thank you.

Maybe we ought to hear the Motion for, in Arrest of

10

Judgment before we go to sentencing.

11

that's the best procedure

12
13

for

Steve Garside present

Martin Gravis present

THE JUDGE:

City

MR. GRAVIS:

I imagine

to follow, Mr. Gravis.

I would certainly hope so,

Your Honor.

14

THE JUDGE:

All right.

15

MR, GRAVIS:

If I'm

successful

in my

16

motion then we get directly to the next one on the

17

calendar.

18

THE JUDGE:

All right.

The

record

19

should show also that Mr. Wolfe

20

Counsel.

21

looked at the memoranda filed by Counsel and

22

welcome your argument.

And why don't you go ahead.

23

MOTION BY MR, GRAVIS

24

(STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM

25

is present

MR. GRAVIS:

FOR

I have
I'd

DEFENSE
MICROPHONE)

Yes, Your Honor.
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1

Court is aware it

2

testimony of Patricia Kling

3

different

4

into evidence under Rule 801.

5

is our position that

the

in this case was much

than the statement

that was

introduced

That in fact she

[I had repudiated the prior statement

on the basis

6

that she testified that neither the police nor the

7

doctor wanted to hear the whole

8

were pressing her to say that Mr. Wolfe had hit

9

her.

story, that

they

They didn't want to hear the part about

10

where she had hit him and kicked him in the groin

11

with her steel-toed cowboy boot prior to his

12

hitting her.

13

It's our position that when she

repudiated

14

the prior statement, though admissible

15

Rule 801 it's, it cannot be the basis for a

16

conviction without corroboration.

17

upon the case of, just a m i n u t e , I have it right

18

here.

19

brief.

20

under

That's

based

State versus Ramsey which we cite in our

As the Court had pointed out in the
memorandum

(?)

decision, State versus Mowell

22 || requires that the City prove the absence- of
23 || self-defense beyond a reasonable

doubt.

It

is

24 || our position that Patricia Kling testified that
25 || was the aggressor, that Mr. Wolfe acted
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1

self-defense and she was trying

2

groin a second time when he slapped her and pushed

3

her and his actions occurred.

4

corroboration that that is not what

5

That, that her, the State offers that, well the

6

doctor and the police officer but neither one of

7

those were eyewitnesses.

8

that she was injured but they were not there to see

9

what happened prior to the i n j u r i e s .

10

to kick him in the

That there is no
happened.

They could certainly

The City also attempts

to argue

that

11

Mr. Wolfe did not state this at the time he was

12

arrested.

13

the, that this Court heard the evidence,

14

findings of the fact which are incorporated

15

Statement of Fact in, in my memorandum.

16

therefore, they're attempting

17

evidence or argufe things that the Court has not

18

found as evidence.

19
20 II

First off, it

that

that

entered
in the

And

to bring in new

it

is our position

under State versus Palmer, which is a Court

21 || of Appeals
22 II

is our position

And more importantly

see

Appeals

case, 860 P.2nd 339, that the Court of

in Utah has held following

the

federal

23 || rule, Federal Supreme Court that although
24 || h i s , Mr. Wolfe's pre or p o s t - a r r e s t ,
25 || silence may be admissible
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1

it's not admissible under the City's case in

2

chief.

3

about what happened corroborates M s . Kling's

4

statement

5

that the Court can consider as evidence.

6

And, therefore, to argue that his

"

is improper, that that is not

silence
prior

something

The Court may recall M r . , Mr. Wolfe was

7

arrested.

Prior to the arrest he admitted that he

8

struck M s . Kling and that he was sorry.

9

not, he was not further questions nor was he given

10

his Miranda warning.

11

entire

12

But he did--

But he did

That was his

statement.
' Now in the Palmer case, that is

somewhat

13

similar facts.

14

been, was under investigation on a child

15

abuse case and called the detective and talked to

16

the detective.

17

tried to admit that he never, that he never

18

that he committed the act so, therefore, it was a

19

conscious

20

the City is trying to argue here is that because he

21

never denied or never stated that he was acting

22

self-defense

23

indication of his guilt.

24
25

In that case the defendant

had

sexual

And the State at that, in that

inference of his guilt.

case

denied

And that's what

in

that therefore he, it's a conscious

We would submit that the Palmer case does
not allow that, the Court to make that
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1

Although when Mr. Wolfe took the stand that they,

2

the City certainly had the ability of--

3

recall whether they did even ask him about it.

4

it's only for impeachment p u r p o s e s , not

5

introduction

* 6

I can't
But

for

in the case in chief.

THE JUDGE:

Can I ask you about that?

I

7

don't remember the Palmer case

specifically,

8

Mr. Gravis, but I would think that if the case, or

9

the investigation I guess more accurately,

had

10

progressed

11

required then silence after that point should be

12

properly excluded

13

given.

14

to the point where a Miranda warning

was

if the Miranda warning was not

Now are you saying that that's

comparable

15

to the facts here?

That this had progressed to the

16

point, the investigation here, that Miranda

17

should have been given before Mr. Wolfe's

18

to the

warning

statement

officers?

19

MR. GRAVIS:

No, I'm

not, Your Honor.

20

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

21

MR, GRAVIS:

Palmer was a telephone

22

call.

The defendant, the investigative

23

left a card with, at the defendant's

24

being unable to contact him.

25

the Palmer case, Mr. Palmer had called
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1

detective on the telephone and the

2

that was admitted

3

conversation.

4

he had not been charged at that point.

5

even--

6

into evidence was a telephone

The defendant

was not in custody,
He wasn't

He was, he was talking on the telephone.
And the Court of Appeals

7

pre-Miranda

8

chief.

9

has held that too.

.0

conversation

says that

silence is not admissible

in a case in

And the Utah, United States Supreme
Post, clearly

post-Miranda

silence, exercising the right

is never

11

but even pre-Miranda

is admissible

12

for impeachment purposes.

13

case--

14

THE JUDGE:

15

brief.

16
brief.

18

City's

19

II

admissible
only

Now that, in the Palmer

This is not cited in your

Or is it?
MR. GRAVIS:

17

silence

Court

No.

It's not cited in my

This is in response

to the State's, the

argument.
THE JUDGE:

The one

time I need my

laptop

20 || at the bench to look up a case and I haven't
21 || brought
22 ||

it .
MR. GRAVIS:

I do have a copy but

I'm

23 || sorry, I should have had them make copies for you
24 II and Mr. Garside
25

THE

JUDGE

All
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1

MR. GRAVIS:

But just to let you know, in

2

Palmer they cite the case of Jenkins

3

Anderson, United States Supreme Court case where

4

the United States Supreme Court held

5

pre-arrest pre-Miranda warning

*6

used to impeach a defendant's

versus

that

silence could be
exculpatory

testimony

7

at trial.

But it did not, the Court in going

8

through the Palmer case says that it cannot be used

9

as in, in the case in chief.

10

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

11

MR. GRAVIS:

So we're dealing with a

12

situation here where like Palmer, this

13

closer to the facts of Palmer because Palmer was

14

not in custody.

15

he was not in the process of being arrested.

16

Palmer he was talking to the detective on the

17

telephone.

18

The officers weren't

THE JUDGE:
what you're

saying in applying

20

understand

21

when the officers

22

bushes should not have been

24

defendant

25

said--

In

Palmer is, if I

it, that the statement

of the

found him out hiding

MR, GRAVIS:

sent there,

Well so that I am clear,

19

23

is even

No.

in the

admitted?
The statement of the

should have been admitted.

But what they're saying
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say is also evidence which is similar to the Palm
case.

In Palmer he had
THE JUDGE:

talked--

Well I guess

I need to ask

you at what point is what he didn't

say being

considered?

whole

At what point of this

scenario?
MR, GRAVIS:

In the City's argument, in

their response they're arguing

that because he di

not state that it was, he was acting

in

self-defense-THE JUDGE:

Oh, you know.

In other

words, he didn't raise the question that he was
kicked in the groin-MR.

All

GRAVIS:

Yes .

THE JUDGE:

-- in the first

MR.

That's

instance.

right

therefore

GRAVIS:

correct.

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MR.

And they're

GRAVIS:

that's evidence

saying

that that

happened

because he didn't say anything about
our position that is not evidence
happen.

It

is clearly something

brought up why he

didn't

the point of being cross

that

it.

And it

that it didn't
that could be

say anything about it a
examined.
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1

'

It would have been a different

story if he

2

had, if he had been, been Mirandized

3

and waived his Miranda rights and not said

4

about

5

everything

*6

it.

and

questioned
anything

At that point then he has to tell
that happened.

Because with the officer

questioning him had he had been silent about it

7

then there could have been an admission by

8

at that point.

9

silence

But he was not questioned, he was not

10

Mirandized.

And therefore, it's not an admission

11

by silence

12

to what happened other than his statement

to where

13

he admitted that he struck the victim and

admitted

14

to remorse.

15

incident as to what led up to him striking

16

victim.

17

innocence that he admitted

18

victim, because he did, and that he had

19

about doing it, because he did feel sorry about

20 II

it.

since there was no even questioning

But he was not questioned about the
the

And it's not, it's not incompatible
that he struck

the

remorse

self-defense

I mean, people who act in
can certainly have remorse

for what

23 || they did and feel bad about what they did and
24 || be acting
25 ||

with

But it doesn't mean that he did not strike in

21 || self-defense.
22 II

as

still

in self-defense.
So it's clearly our position that
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1

no corroboration of the City as to the prior

2

statement of Patricia

3

Kling.

The City also tries to argue well,

they

4

never noticed anything unusual about his walk or

5

anything

6

was not kicked or, in the groin area just because

7

he may not have been kicked directly

8

testicles and to the point that he was

9

incapacitated.

like that.

That does not mean that he

in the

Clearly he'd been able to leave the

10

house at some point.

As to, and there is no

11

evidence as to the degree of or exactly where he

12

was struck as to whether he would be walking

13

or anything

14

area does not necessarily mean a kick in the

15

testicles

16

incapacitated.

17

So it

like that.

funny

So a kick in the groin

that would result in him being

somewhat

is our position that the

evidence

18

presented by the City was insufficient

to

sustain

19

the conviction since M r s . Kling clearly

20

her prior statement

21

that, that the statement

22

in that she, the officers and the, the medical

23

personnel

24

brushed her aside when she tried to tell them about

25

the, her assault on the defendant prior to him

repudiated

in that she stated under oath
she gave was not

accurate

(inaudible phrase, no mic) very much
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1

acting

in self-defense and that, so she

2

that prior statement.

3

there's insufficient

4

conviction

5
6

repudiated

And under the Ramsey

case

evidence to sustain the

in this case.

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

All right.

Thank you,

Mr. Gravis.

7

Mr. Garside?

8

PLAINTIFF'S

9

(NOT USING SYSTEM MICROPHONE) . .

10

RESPONSE TO

MR. GARSIDE:

MOTION

First of all, with

regard

11

to the, the silence Mr. Gravis was referring to.

12

Again, I think that that's, that's more than, than

13

corroborative

14

by the City as far as the officers noting no

15

comment either by, by M s . Kling or by the

16

and then noticing no injuries

17

evidence that was presented by the,

defendant

to the defendant.

Now, my recollection of the evidence was

18

that, that when M s . Kling testified

19

she did kick the defendant her exact words were

20

that she got him good.

21

some type of reaction at that time, it was

22

that there was some type of reaction.

23

there were no, there were no lasting, no

24

ailments

25

from, from that

So

that she, that

whether she

observed
claimed

Clearly
lasting

striking.

But I think that the important
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1

is, is I think what the, what the defense has been

2

trying to do the whole time

3

some isolated pieces of this whole evening.

4

would submit to the Court that

5

appropriate

6

evening.

7

Who was the aggressor in the dispute?

8

it that would have actually been

9

self-defense?

10

is, is try to look at

I think the more

thing to do is look at the

entire

How was it that the dispute

It's uncontroverted

I

started?
Who, who is

using

that while they were,

11

they were at a club or a bar drinking that the

12

defendant got into a disagreement

13

people.

14

somewhat

15

guess what, you're wrong.

16

her for that.

17

leave she again refused to let him drive because of

18

the amount of alcohol that he had consumed.

19

had again became angry.

20

home, my recollection of the evidence

21

home that he was berating her again.

22

M s . Kling testified

with some other

that, that

she

intervened and said, you know Mr. Wolfe,
And so he was angry with

Then when it came time for them to

He

She said that on the way
is on the way

Then when we get home again it's not

23

controverted

that all she wanted

24

go to bed, go to sleep, end the day.

25

wouldn't

let her.

to do was just to
And he

He was pushing her, he was
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1

shoving her, he would not leave her alone.

2

he's still doing this pushing and shoving

3

when she acknowledges

4

that she slaps

While
that's

him.

And then her written statement and her

5

statement

6

follows that same line.

7

response to her slapping him is when he hits her in

8

the face with a closed fist and her, and then she

9

gets the bloody nose.

10

to the police and to the officer

She slapped him and in

Now, I would submit to the Court that,

11

that that is consistent as opposed

12

to somehow M s . Kling now becoming

13

she now knees the defendant

14

punches her to stop her from doing

15

time.

16

then

to, as opposed
the aggressor and

in the groin and he
it a second

I submit to the Court now I think the

17

evidence was also clear that this was Ms. Kling's

18

home, that Mr. Wolfe's name is nowhere on it.

19

was occurring within her home.

20 II

was trying to stop his pushing and shoving, like I

This

The fact that she

21 || said, all she wanted to do w a s , was to go to sleep.
22 ||

I think it's interesting

to note that both

23 || the Ramsey case and the Webb case that are cited
24 || by, by the defense counsel are cases

involving

25 || sexual abuse of some young children and it was
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1 || their out-of-court

statements without

2 || corroboration that occurred
3 || convictions were
4

II

in court

any
is why those

overturned.

Here we did have that corroboration.

5

fact that the interview with the police and the

6

interview with the, with the emergency

7

physician was separated

8

individuals

9

same.

in time,

room

different

involved, but the results are the

And now Ms. Kling's

saying

that they didn't

10

want to hear the fact that she had struck

11

defendant

12

curiosity.

13

The

I would submit to the Court is,

Another curiosity that

the
is a

is pointed out in

14

the memorandum

is, is how her testimony

is further

15

reflected

16

a written statement.

17

the doctor it was a closed fist to the nose, by the

18

defendant

19

day of trial then it became nothing more than a

in the fact that at the time--

That was

At the time that she spoke to

to her nose.

In her testimony at the

20 II slap that happened to catch her nose.

Significant

21 || differences.
22 ||

Now the case cited by, by the Court in its

23 || decision as well as the defense
24 || State versus Nowell
25 || of self-defense.

counsel is the

(?) as far as the

utilization

I think that the facts in that
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1

case are interesting.

It's basically what that is,

2

it's a couple of transients both looking

3

and they, they ended up buddying up in, in Salt

4

Lake.

5

got into a fight.

6

being a victim was able to take a knife away from

7

the individual who ended up being the

8

while they're having this fight.

9

actually

for work

And they were drinking and pretty soon they
Well the person who ended up

stabbed the defendant

defendant

And the victim

a couple .of times.

10

Well, while the wrestling

11

then was able to get the knife back from the, from

12

the person who ended up being the victim and then

13

began stabbing the victim who eventually died

14

multiple

15

defendant had regained the knife basically

16

fight was over, his license of self-defense

17

gone.

18
19

stab wounds.

continued

The Court

the

defendant

from

said once the
the
was

Well, I would submit to the Court that,
II that here we, if, even taking the case as, as

20 || defense counsel presents

it, any license

21 || Mr. Wolfe had to exercise

that

self-defense was gone.

22 || And the fact that, that she was trying to repel his
23 || attacks and he ends up being the aggressor in her
24 || home I would submit to the Court

falls in line with

25 || those facts and Mr. Wolfe did not have the
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1

to use self-defense

2

in this case.

And again, as far as us proving

the

3

absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt,

4

1 think that the case of Nowell

5

this

6

witness.

7

of fact has to weigh.

8

Court's findings in, in this matter did weigh, the

9

weight, did give, the weight and credibility to the

(?) states

that

is no different than someone using an alibi
This is just something

that the

And I believe

finder

in the

10

various witnesses and, and reflected

11

defendant's

12

As well as M s . Kling's now.

13

period of time now that they've reconciled and are

14

still living

testimony was somewhat

the fact that

self-serving.

It changed over a

together.

15

I would submit to the Court that, that the

16

evidence clearly supports a conviction and that the

17

conviction stands.

18
19
20
21
22

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.
All right.

Thank you.

Mr. Gravis?
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY MR. GRAVIS

FOR DEFENSE

(STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM
MR. GRAVIS:

MIC)

Yes, Your Honor.

23

as the Nowell

(sp?) case states

24

duty to prove beyond a reasonable

25

self-defense

did not exist.
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1

Mr. Garside wants to point out that this

2

is M r s . Kling's home.

Y e s , she is the owner.

But

3

Mr. Wolfe had been living there

4

of time too so it's his residence also.

5

this is a situation where after she had slapped him

6

and kicked him she was, she testified

7

attempting

8

her.

9

not a situation where the fight was over, that he

0

got the knife or anything else.

for a long period
Further,

she was

to do it again at the time that he hit

So I would submit that this is not, this is

This was a, she

11

was attempting to strike him.

12

time when she testified that she was trying to kick

13

him again when he hit her.

14

I THE JUDGE:

And there's

another

Well Mr. Garside argues that,

15

and my recollection of the facts

16

home and she went in the bedroom,

17

get to sleep when he was pushing her and

18

her and trying to fulminate

19

confrontation or argument when she slapped him.

20
21

she was trying to
shoving

some kind of a

Couldn't he just back away then and stop
pushing her and shoving

22
23

is that they got

MR. GRAVIS:

her?
Your Honor, I remember

you went into the testimony.

that

And it's been a while

!

24

since the trial.

25

was mutual also.

But, but the shoving and pushing
And y e s , he could have
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1

away and she could have backed away but the law of

2

self-defense does not require you to retreat.

3

THE JUDGE:

Well self-defense

from what?

4

1 mean if she's, if you're pushing

5

they turn around and retaliate by slapping you

6

then, then why can't you just back

7
8

somebody and

away?

This isn't a case, is it, where she's the
aggressor coming after him?

9

MR. GRAVIS:

I think that the

10

was they were arguing.

11

is somewhat

12

But my memory

13

was involved

14

where, where she had started the pushing

15

started the, then the further

16
17
18

testimony

And like I say, my memory

faded with the time since the trial.
is that the testimony was that she
in the pushing.

This was a situation
and

aggression.

THE JUDGE:

All right.

Please go

MR. GRAVIS:

But as I stated this,

ahead.
this

19

is not a situation where, as Mr. Garside would

20

the Court to believe, that there's a defense of

21

habitation on her part because

22

both in their habitat.

23

legal owner he had, he had been a resident

24

for quite sometime.

25

for quite sometime and maintain that

like

this is, they're

Though she may be the

They'd been living
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1

now.

2

Furthermore as I stated,

this is not a

3

case where there was a weapon involved and he got

4

the knife back.

5

when he hit her.

6

situation where it's a, that's where

7

differentiates

8

importantly as I stated, the self-defense does not

9

require the, the actor to retreat.

10
11

She was trying to kick him again
I'd

submit that that is a

from the Nowell

it

(?) case.

But more

So we would submit that there is
insufficient

12

evidence for the

THE JUDGE:

conviction.

All right.

Thank you.

In

13

her statement to the police she stated that she was

14

just trying to go to bed and he kept after her, he

15

was shoving her and pushing her, pushed her down on

16

the bed.

17

just kept shoving her.

18

She got angry and slapped him and he

MR. GRAVIS:.

19

argument

20 II

admissible.

Well the statement, what our

is, is that the statement

is not

It cannot be the basis of the

21 || conviction where she's repudiated

that

statement.

22 || That's our position that her, her testimony
23 II

trial repudiates that statement.

24 || under Ramsey that, that the Court
25 ||

THE JUDGE:

in

It's our position
cannot--

Yes.

But the cases,

PENNY C. ABBOTT,

CSR/TRANSCRIBER
PAGE 152

1 || Mr. Gravis, the cases you cite use the words
2 || on the basis of an out-of-court, unsworn

solely

statement

3 || and, and entirely and standing alone and things of
4 II that kind.

That's what the statements are in the

5

cases you cite to the Court.

6

fit these facts.

7

MR. GRAVIS:

That

simply

I would submit

it does fit

8

the facts.

9

people that were there when it happened--

10

There's actually n o - -

THE JUDGE:

do you say about doctor, or Officer

12

testimony?

14
15
16
17

MR. GRAVIS:
when it happened.

there

He--

THE JUDGE:

Well, he doesn't have to be

there when it happened.
MR. GRAVIS:

But he didn't--

relying on here are the statements

19

defendant--

20

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

21

MR. GRAVIS:

--

23

Hill's

Officer Hill wasn't

18

22

There are two

But what, what do you, what

11

13

doesn't

All

he's

of the

and the statements of

M s . Kling.
THE JUDGE:

Well now, now then isn't the

24

statement of the defendant additional

25

say are solely the repudiated
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1

M r s . Kling?

2

MR. GRAVIS:

But to, to show that

3

self-defense does not exist based upon his

4

statement you'd have to rely on his silence as, as

5

evidence

6

instead of impeachment.
THE JUDGE:

Well, let's go to that for

7

just a minute.

What are you saying?

That, that

8

if an officer asks you a question about

9

and you respond with a statement

something

like yes, I hit

10

her.

11

and say but she kicked me in the groin first, that

12

then that silence, the one

13

other

14

The fact that you don't then also go ahead

is admissible but the

isn't?
MR. GRAVIS:

Well, the officer in this

15

case didn't question the defendant.

16

the statement that he was never Mirandized,

17

questioned.

18
19

THE JUDGE:
acknowledged

All right.

He made, made
never

But you, you

earlier his statement

comes in.

20 II

MR. GRAVIS:

His statement

21 ||

THE JUDGE:

Why doesn't

comes in.

the absence at

22 || that very moment of a claim that she kicked me in
23 || the groin, why doesn't that come
24 ||

MR, GRAVIS:

Because

in?

it's the same, same

25 || situation as Palmer.
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1 ||

THE JUDGE:

2 || pre-Miranda
3

Well,

if the one is a

statement and admissible, why isn't the

II other?

4

MR. GRAVIS:

The silence

isn't

because

5

you're asking a Court or a finder of fact to

6

speculate what the silence may mean.

7

THE JUDGE:

8

the affirmative

9

silence?

Well, wouldn't

the, wouldn't

statement be more damaging than the

If they're both pre-Miranda and the one

10

is inadmissible, I can't see why the other

11

be.

12

MR. GRAVIS:

Well it's p r e - -

wouldn't

Because

13

silence can mean anything.

It, it is admissible

14

for impeachment purposes.

15

have held.

16

takes the stand and he's been silent

17

something, you can question him about his silence.

18

But to argue that it's substantive

19

submit, particularly where

That's what the

When the witness, when the

20 || situation where

courts

defendant

about

evidence

I would

it's not, it's not a

he's being silent after being

21 H asked a question where you can say it's an
22 || admission by silence where when some, you would
23 || expect somebody to respond to the question and by
24 || not responding there's somehow an admission by
25 || silence as recognized by the Rules of Evidence,
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1

there are admissions by silence.

2

But this

is not a situation where the

3

officer is questioning him and

4

his Miranda rights, that he's being questioned

5

when they get to the question about what

* 6

he's waived,

this fight, who started it, that he

waived
and

started

remained

7

silent, not invoking his 5th Amendment

8

simply remained silent and therefore you can infer

9

that the silence is an admission.

10

right but

In this case he was not questioned

11

it so you're, you're speculating

12

didn't mention it.

13

guilt, it may be some other inferences.

14

testimony was he was intoxicated

15

and remorseful.

16

is not inconsistent with acting

about

as to why he

It may be an inference of

He admitted

His

and he was

sorry

that he hit her which

All right.

in self-defense.

17

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

18

The Court hasn't read the Palmer case and

19

I, of course, will take a look at it.

But based on

20

the way it's been characterized

21

Court doesn't believe that the silence of

22

defendant, that is the absence of a claim by

23

defendant

24

was not admissible.

25

makes one

for the Court, the

to having been assaulted by M s . Kling,
The Court believes that if he

statement, his failure
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1

statement at the same time should be

2

If the one

3

in the Court's view.

4

is admissible

considered.

certainly the other

is

The Court denies the Motion in Arrest of

5

Judgment.

6

sentencing now and if you'd

7

Mr. Gravis, the Court would be glad to hear that.

8
9

And Court's prepared

MR. GRAVIS:

to go. ahead with

like to address that,

Y e s , Your Honor.

I did have

an opportunity to have the Court provide me with my

10

copy of the presentence

report, to review it and go

11

over it briefly with Mr. Wolfe and have gone over

12

the recommendation.

13

follow the

And would ask the Court to

recommendation.

14

THE JUDGE:

15

Mr. Garside, the prosecution

16

input towards sentencing but not required to.

17

there anything you want to say about

18

MR, GARSIDE:

All right.

Then,

is welcome to make

that?

I have not had an

19

opportunity

to review the presentence

20 II

don't know what it is that, that they, that

21 || are proposing.

Is

But generally

report so I
they

it's been our

22 || position to leave it to the Court's

discretion.

23 || In this matter the Court was the, .was the finder of
24 || fact as well and I don't know that any

additional

25 || information could be that much help, at least
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